Strategic Behaviour in Games
Funding: 2014: $56,000
2015: $56,000
2016: $62,000
Project Member(s): Wooders, J.
Funding or Partner Organisation: Australian Research Council (ARC Discovery Projects)
Start year: 2014
Summary: John von Neumann's minimax solution (1928) and its generalization to mixed-strategy Nash (1950) equilibrium are the cornerstones of modern game theory, the mathematical framework for the study of decision making when the actions of different decision makers interact. This project studies human behaviour in situations where decision makers have an incentive to be unpredictable. The proposed research will shed light on the sources of the failure of the theory in the lab, and assesses the practical significance of the statistical tests used to evaluate laboratory data on mixed-strategy play.
Publications:
Van Essen, M & Wooders, J 2017, 'Dissolving a Partnership Securely', Economic Theory, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 415-434.
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Essen, MV & Wooders, J 2016, 'Dissolving a Partnership Dynamically', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 166, pp. 212-241.
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Gauriot, R, Page, L & Wooders, J 2016, 'Nash at Wimbledon: Evidence from Half a Million Serves', pp. 1-48.
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Moreno, D & Wooders, J 2016, 'Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention', Theoretical Economics, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 601-639.
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Essen, MV & Wooders, J 2013, 'Blind Stealing: Experience and Expertise in a Mixed-Strategy Poker Experiment', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 91, pp. 186-206.
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Keywords: experimental economics,mixed-strategy
FOR Codes: Experimental Economics, Preference, Behaviour and Welfare, Preference, behaviour and welfare