Publications

Anufriev, M, Arifovic, J, Donmez, A, Ledyard, J & Panchenko, V 2024, 'IEL-CDA model: A more accurate theory of behavior in continuous double auctions', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, pp. 104840-104840.
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CHEN, X, GUI, L, WU, T & ZHANG, J 2024, 'A theory of symbiotic corruption', Journal of Comparative Economics.
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Ciancio, A, Delavande, A, Kohler, H-P & Kohler, IV 2024, 'Mortality Risk Information, Survival Expectations and Sexual Behaviours', The Economic Journal, vol. 134, no. 660, pp. 1431-1464.
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Abstract We investigate the impact of a randomised information intervention about population-level mortality on health investment and subjective health expectations. Our focus is on risky sex in a high-HIV-prevalence environment. Treated individuals are less likely to engage in risky sexual practices one year after the intervention, with, for example, an 8% increase in abstinence. We collected detailed data on individuals’ subjective expectations about their own and population survival, as well as other important health outcomes. Our findings emphasise the significance of integrating subjective expectation data in field experiments to identify the pathways that lead to behavioural change.

Kettlewell, N & Tymula, A 2024, 'Heritability across different domains of trust', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 219, pp. 549-563.
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Kettlewell, N & Zhang, Y 2024, 'Age penalties and take‐up of private health insurance', Health Economics, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 636-651.
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AbstractFinancial penalties for delayed enrollment could be useful tools to encourage people to enroll earlier in health insurance markets, but little is known about how effective they are. We use a large administrative dataset for a 10% random sample of all Australian tax‐filers to study how people respond to a step‐wise age‐based penalty, and whether the effect has changed over time. Individuals must pay a 2% premium surcharge for each year they delay enrollment beyond age 31. The penalty stops after 10 years of continuous hospital cover. The age‐based penalty creates discontinuities in the incentive to insure by age, which we exploit to estimate causal effects. We find that people respond as expected to the initial age‐penalty, but not to subsequent penalties. The 2% premium loading results in a 0.78–3.69 percentage points (or 2.1%–9.0%) increase in the take‐up rate at age 31. We simulate the penalty impact and implications of potential reforms, and conclude that modest changes around the policy make little difference in the age distribution of insured, premiums or take‐up rates. Our study provides important evidence on an understudied area in the literature and offers insights for countries considering financial penalties.

Kettlewell, N & Zhang, Y 2024, 'Financial incentives and private health insurance demand on the extensive and intensive margins', Journal of Health Economics, vol. 94, pp. 102863-102863.
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Kettlewell, N, Rijsdijk, F, Siribaddana, S, Sumathipala, A, Tymula, A, Zavos, H & Glozier, N 2024, 'Natural disaster and risk preferences: evidence from Sri Lankan twins', Applied Economics, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 558-581.
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Li, M & Mendieta-Muñoz, I 2024, 'Dynamic hysteresis effects', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, pp. 104870-104870.
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Li, M & Cummins, D 2024, 'Constrain equilibrium climate sensitivity via composite likelihood'.