Publications

Bajada, C 2001, The Cash Economy & Tax Reform, ATRF Publications, Australia.

Bajada, C 2001, The Cash Economy and Tax Reform, The Australian Tax Research Foundation, Australia.

Arestis, P, Baddeley, M & McCombie, J 2001, 'Introduction: What Global Economic Crisis?' in What Global Economic Crisis?, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 1-11.
View/Download from: Publisher's site

Baddeley, M & McCombie, J 2001, 'An Historical Perspective on Speculative Bubbles and Financial Crises: Tulipmania and the South Sea Bubble' in What Global Economic Crisis?, Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 219-243.
View/Download from: Publisher's site

Goldbaum, D 2001, 'Price Bubbles and the Long Run Profitability of a Trend Following Technical Trading Rule' in Kirman, A & Zimmermann, JB (eds), Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Germany, pp. 183-194.
View/Download from: Publisher's site

Akasofu, S & de Jager, C 2001, 'Introduction', SPACE SCIENCE REVIEWS, vol. 95, no. 1-2, pp. 1-6.
View/Download from: Publisher's site

Anetzberger, GJ 2001, 'Introduction', JOURNAL OF ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 1-2.
View/Download from: Publisher's site

Walker, M & Wooders, J 2001, 'Minimax play at Wimbledon', AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol. 91, no. 5, pp. 1521-1538.
View/Download from: Publisher's site
View description>>

We develop a test of the minimax hypothesis using field data from championship professional tennis matches, and we find that win rates in the serve and return play of top professional tennis players are consistent with the minimax hypothesis. However, the players' choices are not consistent with the serial independence implied by the minimax hypothesis: even the best tennis players tend to switch from one action to another too often.

Wooders, J & Moreno, D 2001, 'Prices, Delay, and the Dynamics of Trade', Economics Bulletin, vol. 28, no. 7.
View description>>

We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading partner is costly, prices are determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero, even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists.

Wooders, J & Shachat, JM 2001, 'On the irrelevance of risk attitudes in repeated two-outcome games', GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 342-363.
View/Download from: Publisher's site
View description>>

We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the supergame provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Classification Numbers: C72, C9.