Amir, R & Wooders, J 1998, 'Cooperation vs. competition in R & D: the role of stability of equilibrium', JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 63-73.
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We consider a model in which firms first choose process R&D expenditures and then compete in an output market. We show the symmetric equilibrium under R&D competition is sometimes unstable, in which case two asymmetric equilibria must also exist. For the latter, we find, in contrast to the literature that total profits are sometimes higher with R&D competition than with research joint venture cartelization (due to the cost asymmetry of the resulting duopoly in the noncooperative case). Furthermore, these equilibria provide another instance of R&D-induced firm heterogeneity.
Baddeley, M, Martin, R & Tyler, P 1998, 'European Regional Unemployment Disparities', European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 195-215.
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The reduction of regional unemployment disparities is a key prerequisite for the achievement of socioeconomic cohesion in an integrated European Union. This article examines recent trends in the evolution of regional unemployment disparities across a number of European member states to determine whether and how far this reduction is occurring. There is in fact little indication of any widespread convergence of regional unemployment rates. Instead, regional unemployment disparities across Europe appear to be characterized by a high degree of persistence. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that this persistence is an equilibrium phenomenon rather than the result of prolonged disequilibrium in regional labour markets.
Moreno, D & Wooders, J 1998, 'An experimental study of communication and coordination in noncooperative games', GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, vol. 24, no. 1-2, pp. 47-76.
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This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test the usefulness of alternative solution concepts to explain players' behavior in noncooperative games with preplay communication. In the experiment subjects communicate by plain conversation prior to playing a simple game. In this setting, we find that the presumption of individualistic and independent behavior underlying the concept of Nash equilibrium is inappropriate. Instead, we observe behavior to be coordinated and correlated. Statistical tests reject Nash equilibrium as an explanation of observed play. The coalition proof correlated equilibrium of the game, however, explains the data when the possibility of errors by players is introduced.
Slonim, R & Roth, AE 1998, 'Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic', Econometrica, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 569-569.
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Wooders, J 1998, 'Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets', ECONOMIC THEORY, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 215-224.
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We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.
Wooders, J 1998, 'Walrasian equilibrium in matching models', MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 245-259.
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We analyze trading in a model in which the agents and their preferences are the same as in the main models of matching and bargaining, but in which trade is centralized rather than decentralized. We characterize equilibrium when trade is centralized and, by comparing our results with results from the matching literature, we show conditions under which decentralized trading processes reproduce the allocations of our centralized one. We establish that the competitive price as defined in the matching literature (i.e.. relative to the stocks. flows, or totals) coincides, in the appropriate setting, with the equilibrium price in our model.
