Baer, B, Collins, J, Maalaps, K & den Boer, SPA 2016, 'Sperm use economy of honeybee (Apis mellifera) queens', Ecology and Evolution, vol. 6, no. 9, pp. 2877-2885.
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AbstractThe queens of eusocial ants, bees, and wasps only mate during a very brief period early in life to acquire and store a lifetime supply of sperm. As sperm cannot be replenished, queens have to be highly economic when using stored sperm to fertilize eggs, especially in species with large and long‐lived colonies. However, queen fertility has not been studied in detail, so that we have little understanding of how economic sperm use is in different species, and whether queens are able to influence their sperm use. This is surprising given that sperm use is a key factor of eusocial life, as it determines the fecundity and longevity of queens and therefore colony fitness. We quantified the number of sperm that honeybee (Apis mellifera) queens use to fertilize eggs. We examined sperm use in naturally mated queens of different ages and in queens artificially inseminated with different volumes of semen. We found that queens are remarkably efficient and only use a median of 2 sperm per egg fertilization, with decreasing sperm use in older queens. The number of sperm in storage was always a significant predictor for the number of sperm used per fertilization, indicating that queens use a constant ratio of spermathecal fluid relative to total spermathecal volume of 2.364 × 10−6 to fertilize eggs. This allowed us to calculate a lifetime fecundity for honeybee queens of around 1,500,000 fertilized eggs. Our data provide the first empirical evidence that honeybee queens do not manipulate sperm use, and fertilization failures in worker‐destined eggs are therefore honest signals that workers can use to time queen replacement, which is crucial for colony performance and fitness.
Bajada, C & Trayler, R 2016, 'Introduction to threshold concepts in business education', Education + Training, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 458-462.
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Purpose – To introduce to the special issues on threshold concepts in business education. Design/methodology/approach – Provides an overview of the various papers comprising this special issue. Findings – There are no specific findings in this paper as its purpose is to introduce the selected papers in this special issue. Originality/value – Editorial.
Bajada, C, Jarvis, W, Trayler, R & Bui, AT 2016, 'Threshold concepts in business school curriculum – a pedagogy for public trust', Education + Training, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 540-563.
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Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the implications for curriculum design by operationalizing threshold concepts and capabilities (TCC) in subject delivery. The motivation for undertaking this exploration is directly related to addressing public concerns for the business school curriculum.Design/methodology/approach– Apost factoanalysis of a compulsory subject in finance that is part of an Australian business degree and the impact on a subsequent finance subject.Findings– Customary approaches to granting part-marks in assessing students, (fractionalising) understanding of content can mean students pass subjects without grasping foundational concepts (threshold concepts) and are therefore not fully prepared for subsequent subjects.Research limitations/implications– Students passing subjects through fractionalization are poorly equipped to undertake deeper explorations in related subjects. If replicated across whole degree programs students may graduate not possessing the attributes claimed for them through their qualification. The implications for undermining public trust and confidence in qualifications are profound and disturbing.Practical implications– The literature has exposed risks associated with operationalizing threshold through assessments. This highlights a risk to public trust in qualifications.Originality/value– Operationalizing threshold concepts is an ...
Burke, CJ, Baddeley, M, Tobler, PN & Schultz, W 2016, 'Partial Adaptation of Obtained and Observed Value Signals Preserves Information about Gains and Losses', The Journal of Neuroscience, vol. 36, no. 39, pp. 10016-10025.
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Given that the range of rewarding and punishing outcomes of actions is large but neural coding capacity is limited, efficient processing of outcomes by the brain is necessary. One mechanism to increase efficiency is to rescale neural output to the range of outcomes expected in the current context, and process only experienced deviations from this expectation. However, this mechanism comes at the cost of not being able to discriminate between unexpectedly low losses when times are bad versus unexpectedly high gains when times are good. Thus, too much adaptation would result in disregarding information about the nature and absolute magnitude of outcomes, preventing learning about the longer-term value structure of the environment. Here we investigate the degree of adaptation in outcome coding brain regions in humans, for directly experienced outcomes and observed outcomes. We scanned participants while they performed a social learning task in gain and loss blocks. Multivariate pattern analysis showed two distinct networks of brain regions adapt to the most likely outcomes within a block. Frontostriatal areas adapted to directly experienced outcomes, whereas lateral frontal and temporoparietal regions adapted to observed social outcomes. Critically, in both cases, adaptation was incomplete and information about whether the outcomes arose in a gain block or a loss block was retained. Univariate analysis confirmed incomplete adaptive coding in these regions but also detected nonadapting outcome signals. Thus, although neural areas rescale their responses to outcomes for efficient coding, they adapt incompletely and keep track of the longer-term incentives available in the environment.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTOptimal value-based choice requires that the brain precisely and efficiently represents positive and negative outcomes. One way to increase efficiency is to adapt responding to the most likely outcomes in a gi...
Casari, M, Zhang, J & Jackson, C 2016, 'Same Process, Different Outcomes: Group Performance in an Acquiring a Company Experiment', IZA Discussion Paper, vol. 19, no. 9614, pp. 764-791.
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© 2015, Economic Science Association. It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellective tasks. We report that in an Acquiring a Company game, what prevailed when there was disagreement among group members was the median proposal and not the best proposal. This aggregation rule explains why groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark and why they performed better than individuals deciding in isolation in a simple version of the task but worse in the more difficult version. Implications are drawn on when to employ groups rather than individuals in decision making.
Catalano, M & Di Guilmi, C 2016, 'Uncertainty, Rationality and Complexity in a Multi Sectoral Dynamic Model: The Dynamic Stochastic Generalized Aggregation Approach', CAMA Working Paper, vol. 157, no. 16, pp. 117-144.
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© 2017 Elsevier B.V. The paper proposes an innovative approach for the analytical solution of agent-based models. The approach is termed dynamic stochastic generalized aggregation (DSGA) and is tested on a macroeconomic model articulated in a job and in a goods markets with a large number of heterogeneous and interacting agents (namely firms and workers). The agents heuristically adapt their expectations by interpreting the signals from the market and give rise to macroeconomic regularities. The model is analytically solved in two different scenarios. In the first, the emergent properties of the system are determined uniquely by the myopic behavior of the agents while, in the second, a social planner quantifies the optimal number of agents adopting a particular strategy. The integration of the DSGA approach with intertemporal optimal control allows the identification of multiple equilibria and their qualitative classification.
Chen, C, Zhang, J & Guo, R-S 2016, 'The D-Day, V-Day, and bleak days of a disruptive technology: A new model for ex-ante evaluation of the timing of technology disruption', European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 251, no. 2, pp. 562-574.
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© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. The recent failure of major PC and smartphone makers in launching new generations of high-tech products in time shows that analyzing and capturing the timing of technology disruption is an important yet less explored research area. This paper conducts theoretical and empirical analyses for ex-ante quantitative evaluation of the timing of technology disruption. We conceptualize the ease and network factors as key determinants of performance improvement for a disruptive technology. A dynamic consumer model is developed to identify two critical times, termed D-Day and V-Day, of technology disruption. We also show that, if the network factor dominates the performance improvement process, there may exist some 'bleak days' during which a firm would discontinue a 'promising' technology that will eventually disrupt. Empirical tests are conducted with data of hard disk drives, semiconductor technologies, and CPU performance for mobile devices to verify key model assumptions and to show how to estimate the ease and network factors. We also perform a numerical experiment to demonstrate how to forecast the timing of technology disruption. A decision tree and a systematic framework are also developed to operationalize key model parameters and analytical results from a decision-support perspective. This paper contributes to the literature by presenting a novel analytical tool and new insights for high-tech companies to forecast and manage the timing of technology disruption.
Collins, J, Baer, B & Weber, EJ 2016, 'Evolutionary Biology in Economics: A Review', Economic Record, vol. 92, no. 297, pp. 291-312.
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As human traits and preferences were shaped by natural selection, there is substantial potential for the use of evolutionary biology in economic analysis. In this paper, we review the extent to which evolutionary theory has been incorporated into economic research. We examine work in four areas: the evolution of preferences, the molecular genetic basis of economic traits, the interaction of evolutionary and economic dynamics, and the genetic foundations of economic development. These fields comprise a thriving body of research, but have significant scope for further investigation. In particular, the growing accessibility of low‐cost molecular data will create more opportunities for research on the relationship between molecular genetic information and economic traits.
Delavande, A & Kohler, H-P 2016, 'HIV/AIDS-related Expectations and Risky Sexual Behaviour in Malawi', The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 118-164.
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Essen, MV & Wooders, J 2016, 'Dissolving a Partnership Dynamically', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 166, pp. 212-241.
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In financial disputes arising from divorce, inheritance, or the dissolution of a partnership, frequently the need arises to assign ownership of an indivisible item to one member of a group. This paper introducesand analyzes a dynamic auction for simply and efficiently allocating an item when participants are privately informed of their values. In the auction, the price rises continuously. A bidder who drops out of the auction, in returnfor surrendering his claim to the item, obtains compensation equal to the difference between the price at which he drops and the preceding drop price. When only one bidder remains, that bidder wins the item and pays the compensationsof his rivals. We characterize the unique equilibrium with risk-neutral and CARA risk averse bidders. We show that dropout prices are decreasing as bidders become more risk averse. Each bidder’s equilibrium payoff is at least 1/N-thof his value for the item. Indeed, we show that each bidder’s security payoff is 1/N-th of his value. We introduce the notion of a perfect security strategy, we show that each bidder has a unique perfect security strategy, and thatit coincides with the equilibrium bidding strategy as bidders becomes infinitely risk averse.
Fisher, J & Wooders, J 2016, 'Interacting Information Cascades: On the Movement of Conventions between Groups', Economic Theory, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 211-231.
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When a decision maker is a member of multiple social groups, her actions may cause information to “spill over” from one group to another. We study the nature of these spillovers in an observational learning game where two groups interact via a common player, and where conventions emerge when players follow the decisions of the members of their own groups rather than their own private information. We show that: (i) if a convention develops in one group but not the other group, then the convention spills over via the common player; (ii) when conventions disagree, then the common player’s decision breaks the convention in one group; and (iii) when no convention has developed, then the common player’s decision triggers the same convention in both groups. We also show that information spillovers may reduce welfare, and we investigate the surplus-maximizing timing of spillovers.
Fisher, JCD & Hafalir, IE 2016, 'Matching with aggregate externalities', Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 81, pp. 1-7.
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Fu, Q, Lu, J & Zhang, J 2016, 'Disclosure Policy in Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Stochastic Entry', Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 52-75.
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© 2016 Canadian Economics Association We examine how disclosure policy can be optimally designed to incentivize contestants when their participation is exogenously stochastic. In a generalized Tullock contest setting with two players who are asymmetric in both their values and entry probabilities, we fully characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which no disclosure dominates full disclosure. We find that the comparison depends solely on a balance effect exercised by entry probabilities on the expected total effort. The optimal disclosure policy must better balance the competition. These conditions continue to hold when the precision r of Tullock contests is endogenously chosen by the designer.
Gauriot, R, Page, L & Wooders, J 2016, 'Nash at Wimbledon: Evidence from Half a Million Serves', pp. 1-48.
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Minimax and its generalization to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using a dataset of nearly half a million serves from over 3000 matches, we examine whether the behavior of professional tennis players is consistent with the Minimax Hypothesis. The large number of matches in our dataset requires the development of a novel statistical test, which we show is more powerful than the tests used in prior related studies. We find that win rates conform remarkably closely to the theory for men, but conform somewhat less neatly for women. We show that the behavior in the field of more highly ranked (i.e., better) players conforms more closely to theory.
Johnston, DW, Shields, MA & Siminski, P 2016, 'Long-Term Health Effects of Vietnam-Era Military Service: A Quasi-Experiment Using Australian Conscription Lotteries', Journal of Health Economics, vol. 45, pp. 12-26.
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This paper estimates the long-term health effects of Vietnam-Era military service using Australia's National conscription lotteries for identification. Our primary contribution is the quality and breadth of our health outcomes. We use several administrative sources, containing a near-universe of records on mortality (1994-2011), cancer diagnoses (1982-2008), and emergency hospital presentations (2005-2010). We also analyse a range of self-reported morbidity indicators (2006-2009). We find no significant long-term effects on mortality, cancer or emergency hospital visits. In contrast, we find significant detrimental effects on a number of morbidity measures. Hearing and mental health appear to be particularly affected.
Keane, M & Stavrunova, O 2016, 'Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance', Journal of Econometrics, vol. 190, no. 1, pp. 62-78.
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© 2015 Elsevier B.V. In this paper we study the adverse selection and moral hazard effects of Medicare supplemental insurance (Medigap). While both have been studied separately, this is the first paper to analyze them in a unified econometric framework. We find that adverse selection into Medigap is weak, but the moral hazard effect is substantial. On average, Medigap coverage increases health care spending by 24%, with especially large effects for relatively healthy individuals. These results have important policy implications. For instance, they imply that conventional remedies for inefficiencies created by adverse selection (e.g., mandatory enrollment) may lead to substantial health care cost increases.
Li, KK & Suzuki, T 2016, 'Jury voting without objective probability', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 389-406.
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© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. Unlike in the standard jury voting experiment, the voting environment in practice has no explicit signal structure. Voters then need to conceptualize the information structure in order to update their beliefs based on “pivotal reasoning”. This paper investigates whether voters can play a strategic voting under a “detail-free” environment. We obtain non-parametric predictions in terms of the differences in voting behaviors under majority and unanimity rule. Our experimental results suggest that voters can still play the strategic voting as in the existing experiments.
Lindo, JM, Siminski, P & Yerokhin, O 2016, 'Breaking the Link Between Legal Access to Alcohol and Motor Vehicle Accidents: Evidence from New South Wales', Health Economics (United Kingdom), vol. 25, no. 7, pp. 908-928.
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A large literature has documented significant public health benefits associated with the minimum legal drinking age in the United States, particularly because of the resulting effects on motor vehicle accidents. These benefits form the primary basis for continued efforts to restrict youth access to alcohol. It is important to keep in mind, though, that policymakers have a wide variety of alcohol-control options available to them, and understanding how these policies may complement or substitute for one another can improve policy making moving forward.Towards this end, we propose that investigating the causal effects of the minimum legal drinking age in New South Wales, Australia provides a particularly informative case study, because Australian states are among the world leaders in their efforts against drunk driving. Using an age-based regression-discontinuity design applied to restricted-use data from several sources, we find no evidence that legal access to alcohol has effects on motor vehicle accidents of any type in New South Wales, despite having large effects on drinking and on hospitalizations due to alcohol abuse.
Mendolia, S & Siminski, P 2016, 'New Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in Australia', Economic Record, vol. 92, no. 298, pp. 361-373.
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We present new estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticity for Australia. We closely follow the methodology used by Leigh (2007), but use considerably more data (twelve waves of HILDA and four waves of PSID). Our adjusted estimates are intended to be comparable to those for other countries in Corak (2013). Our preferred estimate (0.35) is considerably higher than implied by Leigh’s study, and is less subject to sampling variation. In an international context, intergenerational mobility in Australia is not particularly high, and is consistent with its relatively high level of cross-sectional inequality.
Moreno, D & Wooders, J 2016, 'Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention', Theoretical Economics, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 601-639.
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We study non-stationary dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection in which trade is bilateral and prices are determined by bargaining. Examples include labor markets, housing markets, and markets for financial assets. We characterize equilibrium, and identify the dynamics of transaction prices, trading patterns, and the average quality in the market. When the horizon is finite, the surplus in the unique equilibrium exceeds the competitive surplus; as traders become perfectly patient the market becomes completely illiquid at all but the first and last dates, but the surplus remains above the competitive surplus. When the horizon is infinite, the surplus realized equals the static competitive surplus. We study policies aimed at improving market performance, and show that subsidies to low quality or to trades at a low price, taxes on high quality, restrictions on trading opportunities, or government purchases may raise the surplus. In contrast, interventions like the Public-Private Investment Program for Legacy Assets reduce the surplus when traders are patient.
MORETTI, L & SUZUKI, T 2016, 'Strategic Transparency and Electoral Pressure', Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 624-641.
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AbstractThis paper investigates how an office‐motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re‐election. We show that, when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. It is also shown that electoral pressure can have a nonmonotonic effect on transparency, but a higher electoral pressure always increases the informativeness of signaling and the voter's utility.
Paloyo, AR, Rogan, S & Siminski, P 2016, 'The Effect of Supplemental Instruction on Academic Performance: An Encouragement Design Experiment', Economics of Education Review, vol. 55, pp. 57-69.
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While randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the 'gold standard' for impact evaluation, they face numerous practical barriers to implementation. In some circumstances, a randomized-encouragement design (RED) is a viable alternative, but applications are surprisingly rare. We discuss the strengths and challenges of RED and apply it to evaluate a mature Supplemental Instruction (SI) or PASS (Peer Assisted Study Session) program at an Australian university.A randomly selected subgroup of students from first-year courses (? = 6954) was offered large incentives (worth AUD 55,000) to attend PASS, which increased attendance by an estimated 0.47 hours each. This first-stage (inducement) effect did not vary with the size of the incentive and was larger (0.89) for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Instrumental variable estimates suggest that one hour of PASS improved grades by 0.065 standard deviations, which is consistent with the non-experimental literature. However, this estimate is not statistically significant, reflecting limited statistical power. The estimated effect is largest for students in their first semester at university.
Perks, G & Maruyama, S 2016, 'The 'Flock' Phenomenon of the Sydney Lockout Laws: Dual Effects on Rental Prices', Economic Record, vol. 93, no. 303, pp. 517-532.
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Geographically targeted crime control is a controversial attempt to alleviate crime by targeting “hot spots”, which risks the potential displacement of crime into bordering areas. The 2014 Sydney lockout laws have severely decreased the nightlifeeconomy in the once bustling entertainment district of the CBD, and there have been reports of increased violence in displacement, or “flock”, areas. These laws have also displaced attractive nightlife entertainment hubs into neighbouring suburbs, which may contribute to the land value of the displacement areas. To address the paucity of empirical evidence for the displacement effect of geographical alcohol regulations, this paper investigates the effect of the Sydney lockout laws on rental prices in the displacement areas. We find differential “flock effects”: a negative effect on small dwellings and a positive effect on large dwellings. The former effect is relatively weak and short-lived, while the latter is persistent, indicating that the positive effect dominates in the long run. We speculate that the differential effect arises because of difference in the locations of small and large dwellings. Our results suggest that well-designed geographically targeted alcohol control can enhance social welfare not only in targeted areas but also in surrounding areas.
Piccolo, S, Puopolo, GW & Vasconcelos, L 2016, 'Non-Exclusive Financial Advice', Review of Finance, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 2079-2123.
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© 2016 The Authors 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Finance Association. We propose a simple model of non-exclusive financial advice in which two households rely on a self-interested (common) expert to make their investment choices. There is only one source of risk, and the expert is privately informed about the risky asset's volatility. When monetary transfers are unenforceable, we show that investors may delegate their investment decisions to the expert. When doing so, however, they impose restrictions on her choices which crucially depend on whether the expert perceives investors' asset allocations as complements or as substitutes. Finally, we analyze the implications of non-exclusivity in financial advice on investment behavior and welfare, and highlight a set of novel testable implications.
Rosaz, J, Slonim, R & Villeval, MC 2016, 'Quitting and peer effects at work', Labour Economics, vol. 39, pp. 55-67.
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Spicer, A, Stavrunova, O & Thorp, S 2016, 'How Portfolios Evolve after Retirement: Evidence from Australia', Economic Record, vol. 92, no. 297, pp. 241-267.
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Households in many countries reach retirement with lump sums of financial wealth accumulated in defined contribution retirement plans. Retired households need to manage risks and generate income from their savings. We study the dynamics of retirement wealth and portfolio allocation using the three wealth waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia panel survey. The average retired household maintained or accumulated wealth in 2002–2006 and decumulated in 2006–2010 consistent with trends in financial asset prices. At older ages, households prefer portfolios with less risk and more liquidity, while maintaining ownership of the family home. The probability of households exhausting financial assets increased over the sample, but households who depleted financial wealth did not liquidate their housing wealth at higher rates than other households. In contrast to the USA, the overall effect of health shocks on the wealth of retired Australian households is minimal, but financial shocks have large effects.
Suzuki, T 2016, 'Reminder game: Indirectness in persuasion', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 100, pp. 240-256.
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Wang, Y & Baddeley, M 2016, 'The problem of land value betterment: a simplified agent-based test', The Annals of Regional Science, vol. 57, no. 2-3, pp. 413-436.
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Xiao, J & Ju, H 2016, 'The determinants of dealership structure: Empirical analysis of the Chinese auto market', Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 961-981.
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Zhang, J & Zhou, J 2016, 'Information Disclosure in Contests: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach', The Economic Journal, vol. 126, no. 597, pp. 2197-2217.
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© 2015 Royal Economic Society We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two-player contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to influence the uninformed contestant's belief about the informed contestant. We show that to search for the optimal signal when the informed contestant's valuation follows a binary distribution, it is without loss of generality to compare no disclosure with full disclosure; otherwise, such a restriction causes loss of generality. We propose a simple method to compute the optimal signal, which yields explicit solutions in some situations.