Boreham, P, Clegg, S, Jackson, S-H, Koe, L-K & Western, J 1982, 'Statement from the Editors', The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 3-4.
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Dwyer, L 1982, 'Value Freedom' and the Scope of Economic Inquiry: 1. Positivism's Standard View and the Political Economists', American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 159-159.
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Abstract. According to what might well be regarded as the standard view among economic methodologists, the economist qua economist makes no value judgments concerning policy ends and their means of attainment. However, in restricting the proper aims of economic inquiry to epistemic goals only, the proponent of the standard view has neglected to ask why we seek to realize such goals; who needs economic knowledge?; for what?; what are people's fundamental needs, problems? In opposition to the standard view I argue that there is no good reason to exclude the promotion of human welfare, enhancement of the quality of human life, etc., sociologically, psychologically and philosophically defined, as well as analyzed from the viewpoint of economics, as legitimate goals of the economist in his professional capacity. Copyright © 1982, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved
Laughlin, PR & Earley, PC 1982, 'Social combination models, persuasive arguments theory, social comparison theory, and choice shift.', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 273-280.
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Individuals and 5-person groups responded 3 successive times to 4 standard choice-dilemma items in the order of either individual-group-individual or individual-individual-individual; 288 male undergraduates served as Ss. Decisions were made for oneself, for a friend, and for a stranger (the hypothetical protagonist of the standard choice-dilemma instructions). Decisions for the stranger were more risky than decisions for a friend, and decisions for a friend were more risky than decisions for oneself. As predicted from persuasive arguments theory, the best fitting social combination model on the most risky item was risk-supported wins; the best fitting model on the most conservative item was conservative-supported wins; and the best fitting model on 2 less extreme items was majority wins. It is emphasized that social combination models and theories of group-interaction processes, such as persuasive arguments theory or social comparison theory, are complementary rather than rival explanations of collective decision making. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1982 American Psychological Association.
